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Abstract 
We set a stackelberg-game model of full postponement strategy in a two-stage supply chain made up of 
one manufacture and one distributor in the first place. We study the impact of decision variables, i.e. 
customization service price and promised customization time of distributor, final customized product 
price and promised delivery time of manufacture on the profit of manufacturer and distributor for 
industrial engineering. 
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1. Introduction 
Postponement is the capability of a supply chain to delay product differentiation or customization until 
closer to the time that demand for the product is known (Gattorna, 2006), and the product is kept in the 
generic form in the upstream of supply chain with lower inventory cost until to the point of differentiation 
closer to final customer. When demand for the product is known, the generic product is then completed to 
meet the unique requirements of the customer, so the customization of final product of specified demand 
characters is finished with higher customer satisfaction, and the delivery time can be reduced but the final 
product portfolio increase (Graman, 2010). Yeung et al (2007) proposed different types of postponement 
relating it to the degree of delay when the final product reaches its shape, form or place, i.e. full 
postponement (ETO, engineer to postponement), manufacturing postponement (MTO, manufacture to 
order) and assembly postponement (ATO, assemble to order), and based on this, Danuta and Swierczek 
(2010) find out the determinants of ETO, MTO and ATO by questionnaire searched in several countries, 
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but they didn’t referred to the problem of customization cost and the response time. As well known to us, 
the most important problem of postponement of mass customization is the response time and price of 
customized product, which will influence the customer choose between the customized product and 
standard products and thus the profit of manufacture and supply chain. If the price of customized product 
is too high or the delivery time is too long exceeding the specified waiting time of customer, then the 
customer will abandon purchasing customized product or turn to buy the standard product on the shelf or 
the more competitive product of other manufacture of supply chain. That is to say, various customer in 
mass customization is some sensitive to the price and response time of customized product, so the 
manufacture must provide the competitive combination of price and delivery time of customized product 
in the supply chain, especially after the CODP (customer order decoupling point) where the manufacture 
activity is driven by customized demand. In this paper, we consider the impact of price and promised 
delivery time of customized product on the manufacture and the distributor under the full postponement 
strategy which is different from the full postponement strategy in Yeung et al (2007) but relative to the 
postponement strategy in Graman (2010), and the full postponement strategy here means the manufacture 
produce only the generic product and the final customization activity is completed at distributor, as shown 
in fig.1. 
Fig.1. full postponement strategy in a two-stage supply chain 
The customer sends order to manufacture who will provide the final product price and promised 
delivery time of supply chain for customer based on the customization service price and time of 
distributor. So the decision sequence is that the distributor makes decision on the customization price and 
promised customization time firstly, and then the manufacture makes decision on the final product price 
and promised response time of supply chain, which form a Stackelberg game relation, i.e. the distributor 
is leader and manufacture is follower in the supply chain, the decision sequence is shown in fig.2. 
Fig.2. the stackelberg-game decision sequence in this two-stage supply chain 
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2. Assumption and notation 
Assumption: 
(1) The capacity of manufacture is enough and can respond to the fluctuation of demand without 
additional invest. Besides, the customized products in demand are in the range of product portfolios of 
manufacture, so it is unnecessary to redesign product structure or realign the produce process. 
(2) The number of basic or common product is equal to the final product, i.e. each final product contains 
one unit of the common item and the difference among products is cosmetic, such as color, interface, 
appearance, and so on, So the price of each customized product is same. 
(3) Once the common product finished by manufacture, they will be conveyed to distributor, so there is no 
inventory at manufacture. Besides, after the common products conveyed to distributor, all the common 
products can be sold when they are adjusted or modified according to customer individual needs, so 
the inventory problem is not referred to in this paper. 
(4) The market demand is linear to product price and promised delivery time, and demand decrease as 
price increase, so does promised delivery time, but there is no relation between product price and 
promised delivery time. 
(5) The cost happened in supply chain is linear to time, and it includes manufacture cost of common 
product, customization cost in distributor, the penalty cost paid for the customer by manufacture when 
the delivery time exceeds the specified time to keep the subsequent demand, and the penalty cost paid 
for the manufacture by distributor when delayed delivery happened to keep their collaborate relation. 
(6) In unit time, there are always same orders for the customized products in certain market, so the 
distributor serve for the same number customers in each time, and the problem can be regarded as the 
M/M/1 model in queuing theory. 
For the manufacture adopt the mass production mode, so the manufacture time and efficiency of 
common product is stable and constant. Besides, from the supply chain, the work of conveying common 
product and the customized products is outsourced and the transportation time is stable and can be 
regarded as constant for the professional logistics. 
Notation 
The decision variable 
P ：The price of final customized product, i.e. the price of unit product quoted for customer by 
manufacture; 
cP
cT
scT
D
q
ct
: The price of customized service quoted for manufacture by distributor; 
: The time of customization promised by distributor; 
The common variable 
: The delivery time promised by manufacture to customer; 
: The market demand , (according to assumption (4)); scTPD 21 ββα −−= )0,,( 21 ≥ββα
: The orders in unit time for the customized products in certain market; 
: The actual time of customization performed by distributor, ( )cF t denotes the distribution 
function, and is the corresponding density function; )c
d
scπ
(tf
d
mπ , , : The expected profit obtained by manufacture, distributor and supply chain where the 
manufacture dominates the supply chain and both manufacture and distributor make decision 
independently; 
d
rπ
The constant coefficient: 
α : The maximal demand for the final product in the unit time of supply chain; 
1β : The price elasticity of customized demand; 
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2β
cγ
mγ
mT
mC
rC
: The elasticity of response time of supply chain; 
: The penalty cost of unit time and unit product paid for the customer by manufacture when the 
customized product is delivered in postponed way, i.e. the delivery time exceeds the specified waiting 
time of customer; 
: The penalty cost of unit time and unit product paid for the manufacture when the distributor 
can’t delivery customized product; 
: The total time of manufacture and transportation between manufacture and distributor and 
delivery between distributor and customer; 
: The cost of unit common product produced by manufacture; 
: The cost of unit product customization happened in distributor; 
As above, the market demand function is ,
(1)
scTPD 21 ββα −−= ( )0,, 21 ≥ββα
The response time of supply chain is cmsc TTT +=
(2)
For the assumption (7), the promised response time of supply chain  is linear to customization 
time, so we can translate the decision problem of to the optimal decision ofT  . As a result, the total 
orders in unit time is   
scT
scT c
(3)
)
q
ct
,( cTPDQ =
As the assumption (6), the distributor serve for the customers, the problem can be reduced as the 
M/M/1 model in queuing theory, i.e. one service desk (it means the distributor in this paper) serves for the 
customers, and the reach time between each batch follows the negative exponential distribution. 
Similarly, follows the negative exponential distribution with the parameter
q
λ , and λ/1  denote the 
average time of customization performed by distributor, so the density function is: 
(4)
⎩⎨
⎧=) >>−
else
tetf c
t
c
c
0
0(0( λλ λ )
0)
 The distribution function is 
( ) 1 , (ctcF t e
λ λ−= − >
(5)
3. The profit model in Stackelberg game 
In this condition, the manufacture and distributor will make decision to optimize their own profit 
according to their manufacture capacity. The decision and actual performance of distributor will influence 
the cost and benefit of manufacture even the customer service level of supply chain, so the distributor 
must make decision in predicting the decision of manufacture, that is to say, the decision of both player is 
mutual influenced and the game relation of Stackelberg between manufacture and distributor is formed, 
i.e. the distributor decide the customization time and price, and then the manufacture decide the final 
product price and promised response time for customer to maximize the profit after the value of the 
customization time and price is observed. 
When the common product is produced by manufacture, there are three relative cost: manufacture cost 
of common product, the service cost paid to distributor to finish the final customization by manufacture, 
the penalty cost paid to customer as a result of delayed delivery. Besides, the manufacture can obtain 
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revenue in product sale and penalty expense from the distributor for the excess customization time. So the 
expected profit of manufacture is: 
QdttfTtrdttfTtrPCPP
cc T ccccmcT cccccm
d
m ])()()()([)( ∫∫ ∞∞ −+−−−−=π
(6)
In the equation, the decision variable P is the price of final product quoted for customer by manufacture, 
is the penalty cost per product paid to customer by manufacture when the delivery is 
delayed, and r t is penalty cost per product paid to customer by manufacture when 
the delivery is delayed. 
( ) (
c
c c c cT
r t T f t
∞ −∫
cT
∞∫
) cdt
( ) ( )m c c cT f t dt− ]c Q
The profit model of distributor is 
QdttfTtrCPTP
cT ccccmrccc
d
r ])()([),( ∫∞ −−−=π
(7)
In the equation, the decision variable is the unit customization price and time quoted for manufacture 
by distributor. 
In this model, the manufacture and distributor share the demand information, i.e. when the 
manufacture obtains order and sends the customized demand information to distributor, the distributor 
will provide the customization price and time, and then the manufacture will provide the product price 
and promised response time of supply chain for customer. So the decision sequence is the distributor 
makes decision firstly, and then the manufacture makes decision, which form a game relation of 
Stackelberg. The backward induction method is adopted to solve the problem, given the decided 
customization time and price of distributor. Take the equation (1), (2) into (6), and then 
)]()()()()([)( 221 cmT ccccmcT cccccm
d
m TTPdttfTtrdttfTtrPCPP
cc
βββαπ −−−−+−−−−= ∫∫ ∞∞
(8)
The first order derivation and second order derivation is 
])()()([)2( 1122 ccT ccmccmmc
d
m dttfTtPCPTT
dP
d
c
∫∞ −−+++−−−= γγββββαπ
02 12
2
<−= βπ
dP
d dm .
Obviously, the profit function is concave in decision variable P , when P change in[  , the 
manufacture can obtain the maximal profit at the optimal solution
),0 ∞
*P given and T . LetcP c 0=
d
m
dP
dπ :
])()([
2
1
2 1
22*
cT ccmccm
mc dtTtPC
TT
P
c
∫∞ −−+++−−= γγβ
ββα
(9)
The distributor can forecast *P  , so the distributor can maximize the profit by 
QdttfTtrCPTP
cT ccccmrccc
d
r ])()([),(max ∫∞ −−−=π
(10)
Take equation (1), (2) and (9) into (3), then 
ccT ccmccmmc dttfTtPCTTQ c )()()([)]({[2
1
12 ∫∞ −−++−+−= γγββα
(11)
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The first order condition and the second order is: 
ccT cccmmrccm
c
d
r dttfTtCCPTT
P c
)()()2([
2
1)]([
2
1
112 ∫∞ −−+−+−+−=∂
∂ γγβββαπ ,
01)( 2
2
<−−=∂
∂ βπ c
cc
d
r TF
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012
2
<−=
∂
∂ βπ
c
d
r
P
DTF
T cccc
d
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1
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c
d
r Tf
T
γπ
∂
∂
The Hessian matrix is ,⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−−= )(0
1)( 21
cc
c
Tf
TFH γ
ββ 011 >−H 022 >−H 0>H
So the profit function of distributor is joint concave in and . There exist optimal T   to maximize 
the profit of distributor, let 
cT cP * *cPc
0=∂
∂
c
d
r
P
π
, 0=∂
∂
c
d
r
T
π
, and then 
ccT cccmmr
mc
c dttfTtCC
TTP
c
)()()2([
2
1
2
)(
*
*
1
2* ∫∞ −−+−++−= γγβ
βα
(12)
)1(
1
21*
βγ
β
c
FTc −= −
(13)
Now, we get the Nash equilibrium solution . Take the equation (9), (12) and (13) into the 
profit function of manufacture and distributor, and then we can get the optimal profit of manufacture and 
distributor. When the profit of both players is accumulated, then we can get the profit of supply chain. So 
we can find the factors influencing the customization time, such as the average customization time
),,( *** cc TPP
λ1 ,
the unit penalty cost cγ , the price elasticity of customized demand , and the elasticity of promised 
delivery time of supply chain . increase as 
1β
2 cTβ * cγ , λ1  , increase, but increase as decrease.1β 2β
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4. Conclusion 
For various customers in mass customization of industrial engineering is sensitive to the price and 
promised response time of customized product, so the manufacture must provide the competitive 
combination of price and delivery time of customized product to some extent, especially in the 
downstream of the CODP in the supply chain. Given a supply chain is made up of one manufacture and 
one distributor in Stakelberg game condition, we compute the optimal combination of decision variables, 
i.e. customization price, customization time and final product price to maximize the profit of manufacture 
and distributor under the full postponement strategy, i.e. the manufacture produce only the generic 
product and the final customization activity is completed at distributor. The disadvantage of this paper is 
that the relative postponement cost is not considered, such as the new investment and warehousing cost in 
distributor to perform the customization activity, the inventory cost of generic product, which will be 
included in future research. 
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